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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT		
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1. COUNTRY: LAOS/THAILAND	9. REPORT NUMBER: 1 856 0138 68	RECD CO-3 15 JAN 1969
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5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Vientiane, LAOS 19 December 1968	12. ORIGINATOR: OUSAIRA, Vientiane, LAOS	
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>A</u> INFORMATION <u>2</u>	13. PREPARED BY: <i>Dale L. Fulton</i> DALE L. FULTON, Major, USAF AAIRA	
7. SOURCE: 13AF DI	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Robert L. Tyrell</i> ROBERT L. TYRELL Colonel, USAF Air Attache	
15. SUMMARY: (C) This Information Report quotes a 7/13AF Director of Intelligence message dealing with the subject of unidentified flying objects. The message was dated 11 December 1968 and was in response to inquiries to that headquarters from subordinate units. It is quoted in its entirety to show the rationale used to draw the conclusions that are made. This IR is submitted in response to and partially answers SICR U-UPF-21321. Collection action continues.		
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DIA REVIEW COMPLETED

DD FORM 1396

REPLACES DA FORM 100, 1 AUG 60.
OPNAV FORM 5038 (Rev 10-61).
AF FORM 100, JUL 61. WHICH MAY BE
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aircraft lights or other sightings were seen. Crew of Knife 27 suspected
 0100. Radar detected Knife 27 below radar horizon. B. On 020326L Dec, GCA
 radar detected Knife 27 moving at same speed as Knife 26, dispatched to area, but
 GCA lost Knife 27 when Knife 27 approached to within 2-3NM. GCA later lost Knife
 27 when Knife 27 descended to 1000 foot altitude. Knife 28
 approached the searchlight, but the searchlight, but observed
 nothing. Moon reportedly had good illumination, but conditions were too dark to see well.
 As Knife 28 returned to base, it picked up Bogie again 1NM southeast of where
 it had disappeared, heading southeast. GCA lost it after 4-5NM, still heading
 southeast in vicinity of VLF 544. Part II. On 6 December, 606 SOS advisor
 to Thai Border Control Police (BPP), Region IV, reported that BPP had begun
 operation on 28 November between NKP and Sakon Nakhon towns in same proximity
 as above sighting northwest of NKP. Four to six BPP and Royal Thai Army (RTA)
 helicopters were involved in this operation. In addition, BPP Region IV possesses
 one white heavy helicopter, which is used to monitor BPP operations. Historically,
 Thai pilots have been reluctant to fly at night, but the moon in recent days
 has made night flying almost as easy as daytime operations, and Thai pilots
 have been known to accomplish night flights in areas where terrain is well-known
 to them. As in the past, chopper operations by RTA and BPP are mostly local in
 nature and no flight plans are filed for resupply, placement of units, or moni-
 toring activities unless proper pressure is brought to bear. Many BPP/RTA
 operations against communist terrorist are autonomous in nature, and thus
 centralized control is weak. As result, air defense surveillance system is
 often not informed of flights until later—if at all. BPP advisor is attempting
 to secure time so flights in support of above operation, including dates, and
 landing areas. Part III. Historically, November and early December have
 produced large numbers of radar returns, particularly on GCA scopes, from natural
 or cultural phenomena in THAILAND. These include temperature inversions,
 balloons from religious celebrations, migratory birds, and kites. In
 November, 1960, JAF PI and DO ran experiment at Udorn when GCA scopes were
 reporting more than 15 low/slow returns in vicinity of Udorn RTAFB. Group
 observed unusually high scores of balloons, three flocks of migratory birds,
 several kites, plus at least four local choppers in a span of ten minutes. At
 same time these sightings, even of legitimate friendly flights, failed to
 correlate with Brigham (Udorn RTAFB-based GCI radar) and GCA returns. On
 numerous occasions it was established that phenomena, which U.S. personnel in
 GCI site would not report as authentic traffic, was reported into AOC and air
 defense system by Thai operators. U.S. personnel attributed these to propagation
 anomalies. Further investigation attributed a number of sporadic returns to
 over-the-horizon signals distorted by weather conditions.

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To date, there is no confirmed evidence that hostile
 aircraft or helicopters have penetrated Thai air space in support of insurgent
 or communist activities. Though it is possible that illicit friendly flights
 for purposes of private gain, pleasure, smuggling are being conducted, there is
 no evidence to substantiate this possibility at present time. It is suspected
 that Lao and Thai Air Force officers can and do employ RLAF and RTAF aircraft
 in private ventures or travel without filing proper flight plans for informing
 components of the air defense surveillance system. Part IV. Nature of recent
 reported sightings follows same pattern as "unknown returns" reported last
 year by Udon and Udorn. In analysis of possible hostile penetration of
 THAILAND and in support of insurgent forces, preliminary study was conducted of
 technical aspects of such flights. It was found that to land in remote jungle
 clearings at night to airlift personnel or provide resupply was highly danger-
 ous and improbable, especially in absence of sophisticated navigation and
 landing aids, and was beyond technical capability of U.S. air crews. Further,
 study of Air Order of Battle of nearby communist or neutral countries indicates
 that available helicopter strength is such that hostile or unfriendly forces
 do not possess adequate numbers of low/slow aircraft to undertake such missions
 with accompanying risk factor, when they are unable to support their own field

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forces, officials, or units by air. It is not likely, therefore, that they would risk valuable aircraft and crews to support Thai insurgents, when really, infiltration, and movement by other means is cheaper, safer, and less obvious. It is interesting to note that such unknown returns have been reported since 1965 and yet no unidentified aircraft has ever crashed or been physically observed so it could be identified. Friendly suppression forces have never shot down or hit these unknown intruders, whereas U.S. helicopters and aircraft in VIETNAM and LAOS have suffered many hits and losses, and as indicated in Part I, friendly aircraft in area could not observe, even with aid of lights, any other aircraft. In past, when Royal Thai Government offered 200,000 Baht reward for shooting down of unknown aircraft and helicopters, only aircraft ever hit were RFP or RTA choppers and USAF aircraft on legitimate missions. As result, Thai Government has since withdrawn reward offer since no hostile aircraft or "unknowns" were ever downed. It is also interesting to note that in 1967 unidentified aircraft activity, purportedly in support of communist insurgents, seemed to preoccupy Thai officials until U.S. resources provided Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. Then in speech of acceptance and thanks, General PHRAPHAT, Deputy Prime Minister, said helicopter threat from outside THAILAND had ended or come under control. Part V. This headquarters is highly interested in such sightings and reports, and will continue to monitor such activity for signs of hostile intent. However, there is no evidence at present time to indicate rash of recent "Bogies" reported near NKP RTAFB involves hostile or unfriendly activity. Unquote.

2. (C) The following is quoted from a COMUSMACV message dated 17 December 1968. The message was to CINCPAC with information to 7/13AF and referenced the message quoted above. Quote. "This headquarters considers the message and excellent assessment of unidentified helicopter reports in THAILAND. This evaluation parallels our own assessments." Unquote.

3. (C) The most recent reported sightings occurred in South LAOS. On the nights of 14, 15, and 16 December 1968, an unidentified high wing single engine aircraft was observed over Ban Thatong (1526N-10622E), LAOS. On two occasions it was reported circling at low altitude (400 feet). On the third occasion, it was observed at 6000 feet heading west. Estimated speed 100 knots. It has not been determined if the aircraft was an unreported friendly or enemy.

COMMENTS: (C) AIFA concurs with the comments and assessments made and with the conclusion which are drawn. It seems highly unlikely the enemy would take the risks involved to infiltrate personnel or supplies when, as is pointed out, other methods are cheaper, safer and less obvious. Some of the "unknowns" have been reported far enough into THAILAND that large helicopters would have to be used or refuelings made by small helicopters. In order to reach some of these locations, long flights would have to be made over friendly territory, both in LAOS and THAILAND. Again this seems rather unlikely and has not been confirmed by any sightings. There are no known enemy held staging areas or bases in LAOS from which such flights could operate within reasonable range, safety and security and yet remain such a well kept secret for such a long period of time. If any of these flights are, in fact, occurring it appears much more reasonable that they might be unreported friendly activities.

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